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The Limits of Theodicy: An Eastern Orthodox
Perspective on Evil and Interreligious Theology
Rico G. Monge
University of San Diego
THIS essay is written from the vantage point of
a comparative theologian who is personally
steeped in the Eastern Orthodox Christian
tradition and who primarily specializes in
Christian-Muslim comparative theology. It
might seems curious, then, that the present
essay employs the comparative theological
method in order to focus on questions of
theodicy in the Christian and Hindu traditions.
Perhaps even more curious, however, is that I
aim not at articulating a comparative ChristianHindu theodicy, but rather at suggesting that
the most productive path forward is a
comparative theological rejection of theodicy as
a productive enterprise. Drawing from
resources within my own Orthodox Christian
tradition, as well as from the thought of Paul
Ricoeur, my essay will revolve around two
primary arguments: first, theodicy functions
primarily to reconcile human beings to evil’s
existence, thus legitimizing it and reducing the

need to counteract evil; and second, religious
traditions more effectively encounter the
question of evil by teaching a path by which
practitioners can mourn, reject, combat, and
transform evil. Accordingly, I will first briefly
examine two salient instances of comparative
Christian-Hindu theodicy in order to
demonstrate how my approach differs. Next, I
will engage with key critics of theodicy, some of
whom are skeptical of religion (or even hostile
to it), and some of whom are religious adherents
who maintain theodicy is an inherently
deleterious mode of thought. I will conclude by
drawing from both Fyodor Dostoevsky and Paul
Ricoeur in order to suggest a more productive
trajectory for comparative theology and the
challenges posed by the existence of evil and
suffering.
Theodicy in its most narrow sense is a
distinctive feature of the Abrahamic
monotheisms, perhaps Christianity most of all.
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John Milton’s Paradise Lost is theodicy in the
form of an epic poem, for, as Milton plainly
states, his goal is to “justify the ways of God to
men.” 1 The term theodicy itself, coined by
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, etymologically
suggests that the purpose is to render a
satisfactory justification of God.2 In this narrow
and culturally specific sense, then, theodicy is
particularly a problem for the Abrahamic
monotheisms, all of which maintain that there is
only one God—and that this God is both
omnibenevolent and omnipotent. 3 If these
tenets are held to be so, theodicy becomes a
particular difficulty, for as David Hume (and
others) have succinctly put it, “Is [God] willing
to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he
impotent. Is he able but not willing? Then is he
malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Whence
then is evil?”4 While Hume means this to be a
skeptic’s attack on the impossibility of a
satisfactory Christian theodicy, the issues he
raises are the very issues that Christian (and
Islamic and Jewish theologians) have grappled
with for millennia.
Nevertheless, while the term theodicy has
culturally specific origins in the philosophical
and theological traditions of Abrahamic
monotheism, meaningful attempts to explain
the existence of evil and suffering exist in every
major religious tradition. Francis X. Clooney, for
example, has engaged in nuanced comparative
theodicy between the Christian and Hindu
traditions. In his focused study on Vedanta
Desika and Thomas Aquinas, he argues that
despite their significant differences, “There is
no reason not to see Desika and Aquinas as allies
sharing the same goal of putting evil back in its
subordinate place, giving meaning to suffering
and hope to those who suffer, more forcefully
extolling the goodness of God, and, in the end,
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bolstering a comparative project that uses
discourses on evil for the sake of a even greater
good than the one that either theological
tradition could have envisioned on its own.”5 In
doing so, Clooney highlights the practical
import of theodicy; it does not serve primarily
simply to render belief in God/gods logically
coherent, but also to: 1) “put evil in its place”; 2)
grant meaning to suffering; 3) give hope to the
suffering; 4) justify the goodness of God; and 5)
promote the good. Clooney’s analysis here is
deeply insightful concerning the roles theodicy
overtly plays for the religious insider. We shall
return to the difficulties created by this classical
approach below. In order to transition there, we
must first examine Clooney’s interaction with
Peter Berger on the question of theodicy in a
Hindu context.
In his 1989 article focused on Vedanta’s
theology of Karma, Clooney adds much-needed
theological nuance to Berger’s sociological
reading of the kind of theodicy “karmasamsara” provides. 6 Drawing from Max Weber,
Berger argues that theodicies exist on a
spectrum of how highly “rationalized” they are,
and argues that the principle of karma-samsara
in the dharmic religious traditions stands at the
most highly rationalized pole. Clooney notes
that Berger does not “directly engage Vedanta
thinking” in his analysis and thus misses that
the Vedantic perspective is “not rationalistic,”
“frustrates reason's quest for a neat explanation
by maintaining the irreconcilable poles of
freedom and predestination,” and mitigates the
mechanistic aspects of karma by “reserving to
brahman-who is pure intelligence and being and
joy-the efficacy of the system,” thereby
ensuring “that humans are not hopelessly lost in
the system or at the mercy of impersonal
forces.”7 In short, Clooney argues that Vedantic
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thinking accomplishes the classic goals of
theodicy outlined in the paragraph above. While
Clooney is correct that a more nuanced
understanding of Vedanta would shift karmasamsara’s location on Berger’s spectrum,
Clooney’s analysis also paradoxically reinforces
that Vedantic theodicy is subject to the critiques
leveled by Berger (as well as the critiques of the
thinkers to whom Berger is most deeply
indebted, Weber, Karl Marx, and Friedrich
Nietzsche).
Indeed, the very fact that Clooney places
Vedanta Desika and Thomas Aquinas so closely
together itself strongly suggests Berger’s crosscultural analysis of the function of theodicy
remains as potent as ever. For Berger’s primary
contention is that theodicy is central to a
religion’s ability to create a “sacred canopy”
that binds a culture together and affords it some
protection against the otherwise meaningless
chaos of the universe. For Berger, theodicy is
thus not ultimately about justifying God’s
goodness to human beings, but, rather, “the
legitimation of anomic phenomena.” 8 Put
otherwise, Berger argues that sociologically,
theodicy functions to legitimize why things that
cultural norms and expectations would dictate
“should not happen,” do, in fact, happen all the
time. Theodicy thus provides the way for human
beings to accept why the “anomic” or “evil” can
occur. Even more problematic, systems of
theodicy provide paths by which these
occurrences can further be understood as both
legitimate and necessary. Four of the five points I
distilled from Clooney’s comparison of Desika
and Aquinas thus demonstrate Berger’s point;
theodicy provides human beings with the
reassurance and hope that things are as they
should be, and, further, that they will work for
the best according to a higher plan. If 1) evil has
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been “put in its place”; 2) suffering has been
granted meaning; 3) hope has been given to
those who suffer; and 4) the goodness of God has
been justified, has Berger not been largely
vindicated? Evil has certainly not been “put in
its place” other than intellectually. Granting
meaning to suffering renders suffering
“moralized” according to Nietzsche’s most
potent critiques, potentially redoubling the
guilt of those who are already suffering and
unable to convert that suffering into moral
benefit.9 Providing hope to the suffering, if this
comes without addressing and eradicating the
root causes of suffering, offers little more than
what Marx aptly identified as the “opiate of the
masses.”10 Finally, “justifying the ways of God to
men” is, by definition, the attempt to
legitimize—even
valorize—why
an
omnibenevolent and omnipotent God permits
so much suffering and evil.
We will return to Clooney’s fifth point, “to
promote the good,” at the end of this essay. For
now, let us investigate further the question
concerning whether theodicy is helpful or
harmful to religions themselves, and, more
importantly, to their adherents. Western
Christian (i.e. Catholic and Protestant) theodicy
from Augustine to Leibniz (arguably its most
sophisticated expositor) has revolved around
these very objectives of providing reassurance
and hope to human beings, and thus to reconcile
them to the fact that evil and suffering exist.
Augustine agonizes over why evil could exist
throughout his Confessions, finally concluding
that it is Christianity that offers the only
satisfactory answer. For him, the resolution (or
in Berger’s terms “legitimation”) of evil is to be
found in his twin arguments that 1) evil does not
exist, but is a falling away from God who is pure
Being, and 2) that human beings possess free
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will such that even our falling away towards
non-Being is not God’s fault but ours.11 Several
centuries later, Thomas Aquinas adhered closely
to Augustinian theodicy while tackling the
thorny issue of causality and responsibility. For
Aquinas, God’s role as providential creator
means that God is, in a certain causal sense, the
origin of evil (and human free will is not
sufficient to erase that fact). Free will, however,
ensures that “God is responsible for sinful
actions, but not for sins,” or, in other words, God
is causally responsible but not morally
responsible for evil.12 Leibniz, working out this
paradox even more rigorously, posited that this
world is the best of all possible worlds “not only
for all in general, but for each one of us in
particular.”13 In each of these pivotal figures the
bottom line affirms both Clooney’s and Berger’s
analyses concerning the function of theodicy.
And lest I give the impression that Eastern
Christianity is immune to or free from engaging
in theodicy, one need only look at Dionysius the
Areopagite’s The Divine Names and John of
Damascus’s
The
Orthodox
Faith
for
14
recapitulations of Augustinian theodicy. Even
John Hick’s exposition of Irenaeus of Lyons’s
theodicy shows a deep Eastern Christian affinity
for the idea that evil and suffering are necessary
for moral growth. 15 We shall return to the
question of Irenaean theodicy in the discussion
of Ricoeur below.
One might naturally ask at this point, “so
what’s the problem with theodicy?” For
Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, theodicy
demonstrates the human desire to impose
meaning and value on what would otherwise be
senseless and random suffering. This endeavor
to use human rational faculties to create
meanings for suffering that are not actually
there reflects a childish inability to accept the
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world as it actually is. It devalues the world and
our present lives by deferring existence as it
“should be” to the next life. 16 17 Building upon
Nietzsche and Weber, Berger, as we have seen,
argues that theodicy serves to make us
reconciled to the “anomic” phenomena we
would otherwise categorically reject. In the
wake of the horrors of the 20th century, many
Christian theologians are beginning to
recognize these deleterious aspects of
theodicy’s core functions. Karen Kilby, for
example, argues that Christianity should not be
engaged in theodicy, that theodicy has nothing
to do with the Gospel of Jesus Christ, and that
theodicy makes us less likely to feel compelled
to carry out one of the primary duties of the
Christian: to combat evil. 18 Moreover, Sarah
Katherine Pinnock has gathered together
contributions from leading Christian and Jewish
philosophers in an effort to move “beyond
theodicy,” not because theodicy is inadequate to
make sense of the horrors of the
Holocaust/Shoah (Leibniz would indeed have an
“adequate” answer), but because making sense
of it, rendering it meaningful, and thus
legitimizing its occurrence is not remotely
desirable.19
What then should be done? Are theology
and religion separable from theodicy? As
Clooney observes with Desika, theodicy does not
always provide neat answers, and both
Christianity and Hinduism have robust mystical
traditions asserting the ultimate unknowability
of the divine. Does emphasis on divine
incomprehensibility escape the problems
wrought by theodicy? David Hume, Ludwig
Feuerbach, and Sigmund Freud each argue that
while recourse to unknowability may indemnify
God from critique, it also eradicates the very
thing—theodicy—that, in their views, makes
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religion attractive to human beings in the first
place. Hume, for example, maintains that those
who uphold the unknowability of God are
“atheists without knowing it.” 20 Similarly,
Feuerbach claims that the “theory that God
cannot be defined, and consequently cannot be
known by man, is therefore the offspring of
recent times, a product of modern unbelief.” 21
Freud draws out the practical implications
rather succinctly when he asserts, “If you
confine yourself to the belief in a higher
spiritual being, whose qualities are indefinable
and whose intentions cannot be discerned, then
you are proof against the interference of
science, but then you will also relinquish the
interest of men.” 22 Stripped of the hope,
comfort, and security that theodicy’s
legitimations provide, religion will lose its
psychological appeal for the majority of human
beings. Augmenting these philosophical and
psychological ruminations, Berger employs
empirical sociological evidence to demonstrate
that the decline of a religion’s plausibility is
directly proportional to the devaluation of its
corresponding theodicy. 23 It would seem then
that religion can survive neither with theodicy
nor without it.
The writings of Fyodor Dostoevsky and Paul
Ricoeur present other options, however, ones
that are particularly promising for comparative
theological engagement with evil and suffering.
Curiously enough, their approaches have
significant resonances with aspects of Freudian
thought.24 In The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky
famously enlists the character of Ivan
Karamazov to utterly destroy theodicy in the
chapters entitled “Rebellion” and “The Grand
Inquisitor.” Quite strikingly, however, Ivan’s
devout brother (and novice monk) Alyosha
accepts Ivan’s dismantling of Christian theodicy

Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2016

without abandoning his faith. 25 Furthermore,
Alyosha’s spiritual father, the Elder Zosima,
nowhere engages in theodicy, including the
section of the novel (Book VI: The Russian
Monk) that Dostoevsky openly referred to as his
response to Ivan. 26 Instead of a theodicy that
would impose meaning on evil and suffering in
order to render them “legitimate,” Alyosha and
Zosima embody a way of being in the world that
combats evil through radical love—a love that
has the power to transfigure everything it
touches. When Alyosha asserts that the love of
life is of the utmost importance, Ivan is
incredulous and suggests that understanding
the meaning of life is still more important,
because only if life is meaningful is it lovable.
Alyosha’s pivotal response is that he must love
life first of all “and only then will I also
understand its meaning.”27 The reversal here is
more profound in its implications than it might
seem at first. For Alyosha, evil and suffering are
not things to be comprehended, tamed, and
rendered acceptable through logical, discursive
explanations. Rather, it is love, not logic, which
infuses existence with meaning and empowers
one to combat and transform evil and suffering,
rather than concocting an explanation for why
it exists.
This power of radical love is demonstrated
throughout Zosima’s discourses in “The Russian
Monk,” but perhaps nowhere more poignantly
than in the story of his older brother Markel,
who died of tuberculosis while still a teenager.
Previously a skeptic, Markel undergoes a
dramatic conversion in which he is filled with
love for all of existence—for his fellow human
beings as well as for the natural world. Nowhere
does Markel seek (or find) a rational explanation
for why such a terrible fate should befall him.
When his doctor lies to him stating he will live
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for a long time yet, Markel dismisses the length
of his life as irrelevant: “But what are years,
what are months! …. Why count the days, when
even one day is enough for a man to know all
happiness? My dears, why do we quarrel, boast
before each other, remember each other’s
offenses? Let us go to the garden, let us walk and
play and love and praise and kiss each other and
bless our life.” 28 Even more forcefully, Markel
asserts that such love reveals that “life is
paradise, but we do not want to know it, and if
we did want to know it, tomorrow there would
be paradise the world over.” 29 Nevertheless,
nowhere does Markel engage in even an
Irenaean theodicy that would moralize and
validate his deadly illness because it allowed
him to achieve this all-encompassing love. On
the contrary, it is the transfiguring power of
love that renders the question “Why me?”
utterly irrelevant.
As compelling as Markel’s story may be,
Dostoevsky was a man intimately acquainted
with the depths of human suffering, and
Markel’s example alone does not convey the
fullness of Dostoevsky’s response to Ivan’s
destruction of theodicy. Equally crucial are
Zosima’s ruminations on the book of Job. While
Job is often viewed as the supreme example of
Judeo-Christian scriptural theodicy, Zosima
instead reads the text as a sort of manual in
learning how to grieve over suffering and evil.
Indeed, Zosima notes that the story of Job, read
as a theodicy explaining evil, is both ludicrous
and offensive. “How could the Lord hand over
the most beloved of his saints for Satan to play
with him, to take away his children, to smite him
with disease and sores so that he scraped the pus
from his wounds with a potsherd, and all for
what? Only so as to boast before Satan: ‘See what
my saint can suffer for my sake!’” 30 Rejecting
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this reading, Zosima asserts “what is great here”
in the book of Job is its demonstration of the
possibility of healing in which “old grief, by a
great mystery of human life, gradually passes
into quiet, tender joy.” 31 To sum up, what
Dostoevsky shows us is the power of Christianity
not to explain evil and suffering, but rather to
combat it, transform it, and to learn how to
productively grieve over it.
Though not himself Orthodox, the
Protestant Paul Ricoeur likewise rejects
theodicy and expresses an ethos that resonates
heavily with Doestoevsky’s Orthodoxy. In his
essay, “Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and
Theology,” Ricoeur surveys the history of
Christian theodicy and critiques it heavily for
the same reasons expressed throughout this
essay. He then sets forth his alternative vision of
how the texts of the Bible address the challenge
of evil. Rather than offering a logical
explanation of evil subject to “both the rule of
noncontradiction and that of systematic
totalization,” Ricoeur argues that Biblical texts
instead (1) enjoin us to act against evil, and (2)
offer us a five-stage path of wisdom through
which we can learn how to grieve.32 Contrary to
theodicy, which asks “whence comes evil,”
Ricoeur argues, “the response, not the solution,
of action is to act against evil. Our vision is thus
turned toward the future, by the idea of a task to
be accomplished.” 33 Ricoeur thus argues that
Biblical texts offer hope, but a hope that imposes
a responsibility on us. The potential of theodicy
to make us complacent towards the evil it
legitimizes is thereby removed, and in its place
stands the burden to fight against evil with all
our might. But Ricoeur also recognizes that
action against evil is not enough in and of itself.
This is because evil is not merely something one
“commits”; evil is also something one undergoes
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and from which one suffers intense trauma and
grief.
For this reason, Ricoeur sets forth the fivestage path he has gleaned from the Christian
scriptures for learning how to grieve. In doing
so, Ricoeur acknowledges he is also indebted to
Freud’s essay “Mourning and Melancholia.” In
the first stage of this “work of mourning,”
Ricoeur advocates for the exact opposite of
theodicy—the admission of ignorance. Only in
admitting to ourselves that we cannot make
sense of suffering can we begin to heal from it.
From this first stage of ignorance, we can then
move to a second, perhaps even more surprising
stage: complaint against God. It must be stressed
that Ricoeur is not abstractly philosophizing
here; he is following the example set forth by
the psalmists who both profess ignorance of
why evil happens, and, at times, rage against
God for the fact that it does happen. Only by
passing through genuine rage can we come to
the third stage, the realization that theodicy is
not the reason or precondition for belief.
Instead, we come to find that “suffering is only
a scandal for the person who understands God to
be the source of everything that is good in
creation, including our indignation against evil,
our courage to bear it, and our feeling of
sympathy toward victims. In other words, we
believe in God in spite of evil.”34 We find ourselves
here far from both the security blanket offered
by theodicy and from the poor refuge of the
unknowable God (and practical atheism)
critiqued by Hume, Feuerbach, and Freud.
We might here pause for a moment to ask
whether we have become too polemical and
thus blind to some of the insights theodicy
genuinely has to offer. Does not the educative,
Irenaean model of theodicy have some truth to
it, at least? In the fourth and fifth stages of
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learning how to mourn, Ricoeur (and I) would
answer with a cautious “yes.” In the fourth
stage, a person may come to a place where they
discern in suffering “some educative and
purgative value.” 35 The crucial distinction
between this fourth stage and theodicy is that
the fourth stage does not signify the
construction of a totalizing system. The ability
to discern educative value in suffering is neither
an imperative to discover it, nor the assertion
that such educative value necessarily exists in
every instance of suffering. The fourth stage
allows the individual to work out the particulars
of his or her own grief, whereas theodicy runs
the risk of “leading the victim back along the
route of self-accusation or self-destruction.”36 In
other words, it is good and proper to affirm what
value a person can come to find in his or her
suffering, while it is harmful and cruel to impose
on each person the imperative to find meaning
and value in suffering. In the final stage along
the path of wisdom, one may ultimately come to
“love God for naught” just as Job does at the end
of his tale of unfathomable suffering. In
reaching this stage, a person can find an
extraordinary degree of liberation and power
over suffering and evil. As Ricoeur puts it, “to
love God for naught is to escape completely the
cycle of retribution to which the lament [of
stages 1-3] remains captive, so long as the victim
bemoans the injustice of his or her fate.” 37
Again, it cannot be stressed enough that this is
neither a moral imperative nor an explanation
of the “purpose” of evil. The fifth stage is about
reaching a place of liberation and empowerment
that has no need of theodicy whatsoever.
Ricoeur concludes his essay with a
suggestion for a productive future trajectory for
interreligious reflection upon evil and suffering.
Having laid out his reading of the five-stage path
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of Judeo-Christian wisdom, he suggests,
“perhaps this horizon of wisdom, at least as it
appears in the West under the influence of
Judaism and Christianity, overlaps the horizon
of Buddhist wisdom at a significant crossing
point that only a long dialogue between them
could make more conspicuous….” 38 While
Ricoeur, without explanation, specifies
Buddhism here as a dialogue partner, it should
be clear that the same sentiment would hold
true for Vedantic wisdom. How might karmasamsara show up radically differently if we were
to focus on how it guides adherents in
combatting evil and learning how to mourn?
How
might
comparative
theological
engagement along these lines yield real, practical
value in dealing with evil and suffering? With
Ricoeur, I suggest this is the most productive
path forward in interreligious engagement with
the question of evil.
The time is ripe for further comparative
investigations of the wisdom by which religious
traditions guide adherents in the face of evil. In
doing so, we will not only avoid the dangers and
pitfalls of theodicy, we will almost assuredly
empower people of all faith traditions to more
effectively confront the evil and suffering that
comes to us all. How might the insights of
Clooney’s fifth point, “to promote the good,”
come to greater fruition through Hindu-

Christian reflection on evil and suffering? I will
close this essay by highlighting one recent
constructive work of theology from within the
Hindu tradition, Anantanand Rambachan’s A
Hindu Theology of Liberation: Not-Two Is Not
One.39 Like Dostoevsky and Ricoeur, Rambachan
is wary of the way the term “theology” has been
used in the past, as well as the role it has played
in legitimizing suffering rather than promoting
the good and strengthening the ability of
religious practitioners to combat evil, be
liberated from suffering, and to learn to grieve
in ways that do not further compound one’s
suffering.40 For Rambachan, the role of theology
is not to provide a theodicy that legitimizes evil
by “problematizing the world,” but, rather, to
bring about “liberation.” In his words,
“Liberation is a new understanding of self and
world. The consequence of knowing oneself to
be a full being is freedom from greed. One shares
the most profound identity with all beings when
one knows oneself to be the self of all. Wisdom
blossoms in compassion, that is, the seeing of
oneself in the sorrows and joys of others, in
generosity, and in self-control.”41 With Clooney,
Dostoevsky, Ricoeur, and Rambachan, a new
future for comparative and interreligious
theological reflection is upon us—provided we
can continue to escape the limits and pitfalls of
theodicy.
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